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Abstract
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma is a game that produces many counter-
intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very sim-
ple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a
competitive world, that individual fitness needs not to be the most impor-
tant criteria of success, and that some strategies are very strong in a direct
confrontation but could still perform poorly on average or are evolutionarily
unstable.
In this contribution, we present a strategy – PREDICTOR – which ap-
pears to be “sentient” and chooses to cooperate when playing against some
strategies, but defects when playing against others, without the need to
record “tags” for its opponents or an involved decision-making mechanism.
To be able to operate in the highly-contextual environment, as modeled by
the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, PREDICTOR learns from its experience to
choose optimal actions by modeling its opponent and predicting a (fictive)
future.
It is shown that PREDICTOR is an efficient strategy for playing the it-
erated prisoner’s dilemma and is simple to implement. In a simulated and
representative tournament, it achieves high average scores and wins the tour-
nament for various parameter settings. PREDICTOR thereby relies on a brief
phase of exploration to improve its model, and it can evolve morality from
intrinsically selfish behavior.
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1 Introduction
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) has been called “the E.coli of social
psychology” [1]. Though simple in structure, it illustrates many intriguing
features of social interaction among agents:
• The single-shot version of the game (the “stage-game”) has a unique
Nash-equilibrium, with the consequence that any game played by two
rational players would end in mutual defection. But the same outcome
would not necessarily obtain in the iterated version of the game, given
that the stage-game is iterated infinitely often or that players have
only limited knowledge about the number of turns played.
• During each turn, each player has a choice of two possible actions:
cooperate (C) or defect (D). The game is described by a 2× 2-payoff
matrix that associates payoffs to each player at each turn. The in-
dividual payoffs are not only dependent on a player’s own choice but
also the choice of the other player.
• The IPD was originally studied to understand the evolution and preva-
lence of cooperation among agents. Both blind cooperation and blind
defection would lead to low payoffs in the iterated game (even though
the latter is the “rational” choice in the single-shot game). The payoff
matrix further makes sure that repeated cooperation between players
leads to an overall better payoff than alternating between cooperation
and defection (2×PO(CC) > PO(CD)+PO(DC)). Cooperation can
be beneficial in some circumstance but not others (where it is better to
defect). This depends on the long-term strategy chosen by the other
player.
For example, given an opponent who chooses to always defect, it is
the best choice to also defect on every turn. The same is true when
playing against a player who always cooperates. The worst outcome
is to always cooperate against an opponent who always defects. How-
ever, when playing against an opponent who chooses to cooperate after
previous cooperation and to defect otherwise, it is best to always co-
operate. The IPD thus illustrates that a strategy that is sub-optimal
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on the short run can be a very good strategy on the long run.
Previous work on the IPD focused mostly on either of two things: how
to devise (e.g. hard-code) a strategy that performs good in a round-robin
style tournament [2–5] and how to adapt the IPD to model quasi-biological
evolution [6–8].
It was found through simulations that particular strategies perform sur-
prisingly well in the game. It is important to note that performing well in
a tournament does not require to win many individual games. It simply
means that a strategy received higher payoffs on average across all matches:
If player one lost all its games by a narrow margin but still reaped rea-
sonably high payoffs each time, and players two and three performed badly
when playing against each other, player one would win the tournament even
though it lost all of its individual matches (Table 1).
Table 1: Winning is not everything. A fictional game between three players
where the best-ranked player has not won any game in the contest and the
player with most wins has the worst cumulative score.
player 1 player 2 player 3 cumulative score nr. wins
player 1 2.25 2.5 2.25 7.0 0
player 2 2.75 3. 1. 6.75 1
player 3 2.5 1.5 1.75 5.75 2
Based on Axelrod [1], one could classify successful strategies into “nice”,
“fair” and “forgiving”, meaning that they are willing to cooperate, but do
not do so blindly and retaliate with defection when playing against a strategy
that previously defected. Moreover, successful strategies tend to disregard
previous defection after some time. The perhaps best-known example of such
a strategy is Tit-for-Tat (TFT), which is a surprisingly simple strategy that
takes only into account what the opponent played on the previous turn. TFT
won the first two tournaments of Axelrod [2, 3], even though participants
in the tournament were previously aware of its existence. Most likely, the
simplicity of TFT triggered the belief that a more complex strategy would
easily do better than TFT in the tournament. However, this was not the
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case.
Sometimes it pays off to play a simple strategy, in particular in more
realistic scenarios where simple and fast strategies have the advantage of
being less costly and resource-intensive [9–12]. But in contrast to folklore
about the IPD, it is not necessary to play a simple strategy in order to win
a tournament. In general, and with the aid of computational optimization
techniques, it is possible to design a strategy that is complex and which will
beat many of the much simpler strategies in the game.
Also spatial distribution, determining e.g. how often two strategies com-
pete against each other, has potentially a huge impact on the overall results.
This is of particular relevance for evolutionary extensions and consistent
with the approach of “evolutionary graph theory” [13, 14].
Furthermore, strategies which performed well in one particular tourna-
ment need not perform well in a different tournament. This depends, con-
sistent with the general thrust of the IPD, precisely on what other strategies
they are pitted against. For example, while TFT was the winning strategy
in both of Axelrod’s initial tournaments, in different settings TFT would
not win. Such was the case in the 2012 tournament of Stuart & Plotkin [4],
where TFT came in third (not first). This could be easily checked by run-
ning different tournaments with different combatants which is now possible
by using predefined libraries (e.g the Axelrod Python library [15]).
A particular kind of strategy was discovered by Press & Dyson in 2012
[16] through the application of some rather straightforward mathematical
tools from probability theory and linear algebra. They made a series of ob-
servations: (i) any strategy with finite (but potentially large) memory could
be exhaustively represented in terms of a Markovian matrix that assigns the
probability of choosing to cooperate in response to each previous state of
the game’s history, (ii) for an indefinitely repeated game, strategies with a
large memory do not have any advantage when paired against a strategy
which would only consider the results of the previous round in the game
(so called “memory-1 strategies”), and (iii) there exist memory-1 strategies
which could either set the payoff of their opponent to some fixed value or en-
force a linear relation between the opponent’s payoff and their own payoff,
effectively extorting the other player. Such strategies were called “zero-
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determinant” (ZD) strategies, because their derivation included setting the
determinant of a 4× 4 matrix to zero. This determinant is a function of the
desired linear relation between payoffs and the probabilities characterizing
a strategy and thus guarantees desired payoff relations.
In a subsequent tournament, Stewart & Plotkin [4] demonstrated that
a particular ZD-strategy (ZDGTFT-2) won the contest, while another ZD-
strategy (EXTORT-2) won most of its matches (beaten only by the trivial
“All-Defect” strategy which is unbeatable in principle). Both strategies
enforce a linear relationship between payoffs such that the strategy receives
twice the payoff of its opponent above a threshold. In the case of ZDGTFT-2
this results in: Px = 2 ·Py − 3; for EXTORT-2 this results in Px = 2 ·Py − 1.
While EXTORT-2 might seem to be the “better” strategy at first sight,
it does not perform well overall. Why is this so? As one could infer from
the above equations, how such a strategy effectively performs depends on
the opponent’s payoff. While EXTORT-2 grants less of the joint share to its
opponent, it might still perform worse overall if the opponent’s payoffs are
low. A more generous strategy such as ZDGTFT-2 might thus profit from
a better performing opponent even though it grants them a comparatively
larger fraction of the joint payoff to its opponent.
However, it was soon pointed out that ZD-strategies are not evolutionary
stable; even though a ZD-strategy could enforce that the maximal payoff of
its opponent is always smaller or equal to its own (and thus that it will
win many individual matches), it might still be beaten on average by other
strategies which could reap more payoff values in other matches (compare
again Tab. 1). While ZD-strategies can control the payoff in any match they
take part in, they (obviously) cannot control matches from which they are
absent. Another crucial issue stems from self-play where a ZD-strategy is
pitted against itself. If such a strategy plays well against other strategies, it
might initially increase its proportion in a population, but it will eventually
face a drawback because it will have to compete against its own offspring
fairly quickly [18]. Mutation and spatial structure might even worsen this
effect.
It is known that the IPD illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing,
that individual fitness need not be the most import criteria, and that some
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strategies are very strong in a direct confrontation but could still perform
poorly on average or are evolutionarily unstable. But it is suggestive to also
believe that players which could sufficiently “look ahead into the future”
and estimate the strategy of the other players are at an advantage in the
game. Indeed, one consequence of Press & Dyson’s [16] analysis has been
under-appreciated. Press & Dyson note that “any strategy which will blindly
adapt” (i.e. only try to optimize its payoffs) is doomed to being extorted.
Only players which are, in their words, “sentient”, i.e. players which have an
idea of what its opponent will play and then make a judgment of whether it
is ok to conform to the extortion or not (in which case it is better to defect),
can force an extortioner to change its strategy to a fairer one.
It is therefore mandated to construct a strategy that does exactly this:
predict the most likely behavior of its opponent and then select an appro-
priate action. Our approach differs from recent work on the IPD in that it
is neither the goal to find the “best” strategy for a particular tournament,
e.g. by applying an optimization algorithm to one of the many proposed
architectures for designing strategies [5], or to understand the evolution of
“islands” of cooperation within a population [8]. On the contrary, we believe
that it is a hallmark of intelligent strategies to cooperate when paired with
some strategies, but to defect when paired against others.
However, exactly when and why to choose whether to defect or cooperate
is difficult to estimate a priori. It involves prediction and decision in a
social (and uncertain) setting. The IPD might help to illustrate many tenets
of social intelligence and learning though experience: in particular model-
based learning, the trade-off between“exploration” and “exploitation”, and
the evolution of moral-looking behavior.
2 Model
We use the standard payoffs of the IPD, where mutual defection (DD) is
slightly more advantageous than cooperation when the other is defecting
(CD) but less advantageous than either mutual cooperation (CC) or defec-
tion when the other is cooperating (DC). In short: PO(CD) < PO(DD) <
PO(CC) < PO(DC). The “classical” payoff matrix is depicted in Table 2.
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Table 2: Standard payoffs for player 1 in the IPD; payoffs for player 2 are
symmetric. Note that defection is always better than cooperation in case
the other decision is known. However, mutual cooperation is better than
mutual defection.
C D
PO(· ·) C 3 0
PO(· ·) D 5 1
Following Press & Dyson [16], we focus on memory-1 strategies and pre-
dictive strategies that compete against memory-1 strategies. Note that most
strategies which have been successful in previous tournaments could be rep-
resented as memory-1 strategies, including Tit-for-Tat (TFT) [2], Win-stay-
loose-shift (WSLS) [7] and ZD-strategies [16]. There is in principle no obsta-
cle to generalize the presented method to strategies other than memory-1
strategies or even to finite state machines which are known to be dense with
respect to all existing (possibly non-computable) strategies in the IPD (cf.
section 4.1. in [17]).
A memory-1 strategy is fully characterized by a four-vector of condi-
tional probabilities, p
(
At = C|At−1A′t−1
)
, each denoting the probability
that cooperation (At = C) will be chosen, given that the player experi-
enced his own previous decision and that of the other player (At−1 and
A′t−1 respectively). The probability of defecting (At = D) is then given by
p(At = D) = 1− p(At = C). Each At−1 can be either C or D, giving rise to
22 possible combinations.
For example, TFT could be represented by the four-vector:
p(C|CC) = 1.
p(C|CD) = 0.
p(C|DC) = 1.
p(C|DD) = 0.
 . (1)
All four-vectors representing the strategies investigated in this work are
listed in the supporting information S1. Note also that this representation
of strategies is equivalent to a Markov Decision Process.
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Based on this, we implemented a strategy which predicts the other’s
decision and learns from its experience (PREDICTOR). Its own decisions
affects (i) present payoffs, but also (ii) future payoffs. It thus estimates at
each turn, based on its model (the four-vector) of what the other would do,
all possible outcomes of the game for n turns (for memory-1 strategies, only
n = 2 are needed). It then chooses the outcome with the highest expected
payoff. We assume that PREDICTOR chooses the best possible action given
it’s limited knowledge (complete knowledge of the payoff matrix and partial
knowledge of the other, as encoded in PREDICTOR’s model).
Given these assumptions, PREDICTOR chooses the action that maxi-
mizes expected payoff, according to:
A1 =
C if 〈PO〉1 > 〈PO〉3D if 〈PO〉1 ≤ 〈PO〉3 , (2)
with
〈PO〉1 = PO(CC)p(C|X0) + PO(CD)p(D|X0) (3)
+PO(DC) [p(C|CC)p(C|X0) + p(C|CD)p(D|X0)] (4)
+PO(DD) [p(D|CC)p(C|X0) + p(D|CD)p(D|X0)] , (5)
and:
〈PO〉3 = PO(DC)p(C|X0) + PO(DD)p(D|X0) (6)
+PO(DC) [p(C|DC)p(C|X0) + p(C|DD)p(D|X0)] (7)
+PO(DD) [p(D|DC)p(C|X0) + p(D|DD)p(D|X0)] . (8)
(For a derivation see the supporting information S2). In a nutshell, PRE-
DICTOR chooses to cooperate in case cooperation yields higher expected
payoff after two turns, otherwise it chooses to defect.
A simple example should illustrate this for a fictive round in Fig. 1.
Suppose that the previous decision was X0 = A0A
′
0 = CD. According to
PREDICTOR’s model (Fig. 1, top), the probability that the opponent will
cooperate in the present round (n = 1) is 1 (i.e. A′1 = C) If PREDICTOR
countered by cooperation (A1 = C) it would reap a payoff of 3. On the next
turn, the opponent would again cooperate with certainty, thus giving a total
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possible payoff of 3 + 5 = 8 (PREDICTOR would chose to defect on the last,
fictive, turn A2 = D).
By contrast, if it initially chose to defect (A1 = D), the payoff would be 5
on the first turn. But this would also affect the probability of cooperation
in the next (n = 2) round, which, according to the model, would decrease
to pC(DC) = 1/8. Accordingly, the probability that the opponent defects is
pD(DC) = 7/8. If PREDICTOR finally chose to defect, it would thus reap a
payoff of 5/8 + 7/8 . In total, the expected payoff would be 6.5.
The rational choice would thus be to choose cooperation in the present round
to steer the game accordingly.
PREDICTOR then updates its model, assuming a prior of p(C|At−1A′t−1) =
1/N0, by a simple mechanism: Update the prior probability to 2/(N0 + 1)
if the opponent’s choice is cooperating and to 1/(N0 + 1) in case it is de-
fecting. Initially, ie. before the match, N0 = 2, so the strategy starts with a
maximally ignorant model. The model is set back to maximal uncertainty
after any match is finished. A flow-chart in the supporting information S3
further illustrates this.
Furthermore, note that PREDICTOR does not require to explicitly rep-
resent encounters previous to the adjacent past turn, i.e. it does not require
to represent the history of a game more than a memory-1 strategies does.
It just needs to be able to update its internal model at every step.
To test the model, we implemented a round robin tournament featur-
ing all memory-1 strategies from the previously reported tournament of
Stewart & Plotkin [4], which also featured ZD-strategies, playing against
PREDICTOR. This includes most of the “classic” strategies such as Tit-for-
Tat (TFT), Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS), or Generous-Tit-for-Tat (GTFT).
Note that average payoffs are heavily influenced by the selection of strate-
gies for the tournament. We chose this setting for better comparison and
to avoid further complications by introducing non-memory-1 strategies (al-
though PREDICTOR could also be used here). Furthermore, even the order
of matches might play a slight role. For this reason, the list of players has
been randomized before initializing the tournament. Parameters were set to
five iterations per pairing, Niter = 5, with Nturns = 200 each. (These are the
original setup chosen by Axelrod for his first tournament [2]). During an ini-
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Model
p(A′t|At−1A′t−1) =
pC(XY ) for A′t = C1− pC(XY ) for A′t = D
pC(CC) = 1 pC(CD) = 1 pC(DC) = 1/8 pC(DD) = 1/4
Possible Courses
X0 : CD
choose C
~~
choose D
""
X1 : CA
′
1
choose C

choose D

DA′1
choose C

choose D

X2 : CA
′
2 DA
′
2 CA
′
2 DA
′
2
〈PO〉 : 3 + 3 3 + 5 5 + 3/8 5 + 12/8
Figure 1: Example of predicted payoff for 2 turns. Top: PREDICTOR’s
model of the opponent’s strategy, which corresponds to the ZD-GTFT-2
strategy. Bottom: The course of possible actions with total expected payoff.
The course which corresponds to the actions A1 = C → A2 = D is high-
lighted in red; the course which corresponds to the actions A1 = D → A2 =
D in green. Maximum expected payoff, relative to PREDICTOR’s model,
is given by the red course. Accordingly, PREDICTOR’s final decision is to
cooperate (A1 = C). This is only so because PREDICTOR looks into the
future. If only the current turn would be evaluated, the expected payoff
would be larger for defection (A1 = D).
10
tial exploration phase of duration ∆ = pexpNturn, PREDICTOR will choose
a random action instead of “exploiting” its internal prediction to improve
its internal model. We recorded several tournaments for different values of
pexp to test the effects of exploration.
We also tested the effect of randomizing an opponent’s initial decision
when playing against PREDICTOR (so, e.g., TFT would not always start
with cooperation when playing against PREDICTOR but only when playing
against other strategies in the tournament.) This decreases PREDICTOR’s
average payoff but does not change the overall structure of our results.
3 Results
3.1 Round Robin
Table 3 summarizes the results for one tournament with parameters Niter =
5, Nturn = 200, pexp = 0.1. The full payoff-matrix can be found in the
supporting information S4.
The evolution of average payoff for PREDICTOR during the tournament
is shown in Fig. 2; payoff against selected matches in Figs. 3 and 4 (corre-
sponding tables can be found in the supporting information S4).
3.2 Exploration vs Score
Fig. 5 shows placement in the tournament as a function of different ex-
ploration parameters pexp. Associated changes in average payoff of PRE-
DICTOR when playing against selected strategies is shown in Fig. 6. (A
corresponding table can be found in the supporting information S5).
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Figure 2: Average score of PREDICTOR after n turns in the tournament and
evaluated every 5 turns (dots); also displayed is a fit to a 1/
√
n function.
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Figure 3: Payoffs for a fictional match between PREDICTOR and TFT. Ini-
tially PREDICTOR chooses to always defect (with occasional cooperation),
followed by an intermediate phase of alternation between cooperation and
defection. Finally PREDICTOR settles on choosing sustained cooperation.
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Figure 4: Payoffs for a fictional match between PREDICTOR and WSLS. Ini-
tially PREDICTOR chooses to always defect (with occasional cooperation),
leading to a good payoff with very low payoff for WSLS. Finally PREDICTOR
settles on choosing sustained cooperation which brings an even (slightly)
better payoff.
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Figure 5: Placement in the round robin as function of exploration (thick
curve: PREDICTOR; thin curves: various other strategies).
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Table 3: Scoring in the round robin tournament; Niter = 5, Nturn = 200,
pexp = 0.1. PREDICTOR comes first.
place strategy name average payoff standard error # wins
1. PREDICTOR 2.547 0.020 5
2. GTFT 2.494 0.016 0
3. ZD-GTFT-2 2.432 0.024 2
4. WSLS 2.418 0.015 0
5. TFT 2.348 0.022 2
6. ALLC 2.164 0.016 0
7. RANDOM 2.118 0.050 5
8. JOSS 2.075 0.032 7
9. ALLD 2.058 0.018 7
10. ZD-EXTORT-2 1.906 0.046 7
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Figure 6: Total payoff of PREDICTOR as function of exploration (thick
curve; no interpolation used) and versus some specific strategies (thin curves;
interpolation used).
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4 Discussion
4.1 PREDICTOR learns from its experience
In the simulated tournament, PREDICTOR was able to score the highest
average payoff across all matches (Table 3)
PREDICTOR learned from its experience to make better decisions, based
on an improved internal model. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where it is shown
that PREDICTOR’s average score, evaluated every ∆n = 5 turns, increases
during the first 30− 50 turns of the game, enough to catapult PREDICTOR
from a mediocre place in the competition to the top. The most important
factor is the ability of PREDICTOR to improve its model during a match.
This leads to better decisions which benefit PREDICTOR further on in the
game.
Particular examples of how PREDICTOR updates its model and adjusts
its strategy are shown in Figs. 3 and 4, where this is shown for its matches
against TFT and WSLS, respectively. Initially, given maximal uncertainty
about its opponent, PREDICTOR would choose defection. In the case of
playing against TFT this would trigger retaliation on the next turn. Average
payoff during this phase would be low for a number of turns. PREDICTOR
then quickly (in a few turns) learns that TFT’s strategy is to always retaliate
after initial defection. PREDICTOR would accordingly change its strategy
and occasionally offer cooperation to TFT, followed by defection. Average
payoff increases to 2.5. Given enough experience, PREDICTOR changes its
strategy to offer cooperation on every tun with an average payoff of 3 which
corresponds to the maximal achievable mutual payoff of 3 + 3.
Even when playing against similar strategies which occasional defect,
PREDICTOR would still offer cooperation, leading to larger payoff scores
in the long run. So PREDICTOR might be characterized as “conditionally
forgiving” (but it would keep retaliating when it thinks that the opponent
is likely to D).
When looking at the match against WSLS, one sees that PREDICTOR
starts with sustained defection, reaping a total payoff of slightly below 3
(due to occasional exploration). The reason for PREDICTOR’s compara-
tively high initial payoff is the fact that WSLS repeatedly alternates between
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cooperation and defection – according to the strategy of choosing a different
action every time it encountered an adverse situation previously (either DC
or DD leading to defection and cooperation in the next round respectively).
After some time has elapsed in the game, PREDICTOR will change its strat-
egy towards offering cooperation at every turn, which guarantees a maximal
achievable mutual payoff. (When faced with such a situation, WSLS would
never defect, except by mistake.)
We also find that the average number of matches won is not a good indi-
cator for overall performance. Two strategies, PREDICTOR and RANDOM,
won half of their matches, with PREDICTOR winning the tournament but
RANDOM only achieving place seven. Also note that some strategies (GTFT
and WSLS) did not win any of their matches, whereas others which are sim-
ilarly placed in the tournament (ZD-GTFT-2 and TFT) won two out of ten.
Tentatively, those strategies which are hard to beat come at the bottom of
the tournament, because the price for their recalcitrance is the low payoff
that comes with frequent defection.
Finally, and as already been noted by Axelrod after his first tourna-
ment [2], some strategies in the game might be low in overall score but act
as “kingmakers”, because the payoff coming from a match against these
strategies makes difference between strategies which would (approximately)
be equal otherwise (cf. the full payoff matrix in Table 5 in the support-
ing information S4). One such strategy is ALLC, which always cooperates.
Strategies such as GTFT, ZD-GTFT-2 or WSLS, which came in at places 2-4,
each reap an average payoff of 3 from these matches, coming from sustained
mutual cooperation. PREDICTOR, on the other hand, finds that repeated
defection is the best strategy when playing against ALLC, thus being able to
reap a payoff of approximately 5. Another kingmaker in the tournament is
JOSS which plays similarly as TFT but with a small probability of defecting.
While ZD-GTFT-2 and WSLS reap an average payoff of ca. 2, PREDICTOR
and GTFT could reap an average payoff of 2.6 and 2.5 respectively, thus
placing them slightly above their competitors in total score. PREDICTOR
plays similarly against JOSS as it plays against TFT: first defecting, then
learning to cooperate. However, PREDICTOR receives less payoffs when
paired with JOSS compared to the pairing with TFT, because JOSS tends
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to defect occasionally.
4.2 PREDICTOR uses exploration to improve its model
Based on PREDICTOR’s internal model, its best decision is to choose the
action which maximizes payoff over the next 2 turns. However, there is an
important caveat to this. In order to build a better model of the opponent’s
strategy it is sometimes advisable not to follow the above recipe of “ex-
ploitation” but to try out random actions in order to build a better model
which would eventually result in reaping more payoffs on the long term.
This can be inferred from Figs. 5 and 6 (thick curves) where the effect of
exploration on PREDICTOR’s placement in the tournament and its payoff
against various other strategies is shown.
In the specific examples discussed previously, the increase in average pay-
off towards the end of the game resulted mainly from exploration. Another
occasion where an explorational strategy is better than a pure exploitation
strategy, is when PREDICTOR plays against itself. Given no exploration,
PREDICTOR will always always choose to defect, resulting in a low mu-
tual payoff of 1. On the other hand, if PREDICTOR played a fully explo-
rational strategy with pexp = 1., this would on average result in a payoff
of 1/4 · (PO(CC) + PO(CD) + PO(DC) + P (DD)) = 2.25. Intermediate
exploration time would yield a payoff somewhere in between these extremes
(Fig. 6; dotted curve labeled “SELF”).
However, too much exploitation is not optimal since then PREDICTOR
would not play well against some other strategies. (In the worst case, it
would play as badly as a fully random strategy.) This indicates a trade-off
between exploration and exploitation to be necessary to successfully compete
in the tournament.
Interestingly, changing exploration time might have a big impact on the
total average payoff (and thus the placement) but not on the number of
winnings which stay roughly constant for all parameter choices (see Table
7 in the supporting information S5). This is consistent with the idea that
the number of matches won is irrelevant for determining the placing within
a tournament.
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4.3 PREDICTOR can evolve moral behavior
Since the early tournaments of Axelrod [2], cooperating strategies tended
to come up high. While “defection” is the unique Nash equilibrium of the
single-shot game, it pays off to cooperate in the long run. This suggests that
the IDP is a good model for the evolution of cooperation. In our tournament
strategies prone to cooperate came high in too (with the exception of ALLC)
– only surpassed by PREDICTOR. However, and in contrast to the original
tournaments, PREDICTOR is not inherently “nice” or prone to cooperation
but evolves such a behavior throughout the game.
It is instructive here to see what would happen when a strategy plays
against itself. First, look at the example of the self-play of a retaliating but
nice strategy, such as TFT. If TFT were initialized with a random action,
and since TFT is a retaliating strategy, self-play would potentially result in
constant defection throughout the iterated game. This means that under
random initial conditions, TFT might perform badly when pitted against
itself or a similar strategy. More precisely, averaging over all four possible
initial actions, the average payoff for TFT when playing against itself would
be 1/4(3 + 1 + 2.5 + 2.5) = 2.25 (corresponding to initial pairings CC, DD,
CD and DC respectively). For this and other reasons, the initial action of
TFT is “hardwired” to cooperation in most implementations. However, this
particular choice might create a different artifact in turn: many strategies
will mutually cooperate until the end of the game and reap the maximal
joint payoff of 3 + 3 per turn. Indeed, half of the strategies entered into the
first tournament of Axelrod [2] were of this type. The tendency for mutual
cooperation as well as initially offering to cooperate, and hence the evolution
of “moral behavior” is artificially “steered”.
By contrast, PREDICTOR takes a random initial action and would first
choose to defect under maximum uncertainty (i.e. when all model proba-
bilities are set to 1/2). So PREDICTOR is neither initially “nice” nor is it
prone to cooperate per se. As discussed previously, self-play of PREDICTOR
would result in a low payoff of 1 without exploration, and possibly increased
by exploration to 2.25, being much lower than the payoff from self-play of
strategies that are “hardwired” to cooperate.
However, PREDICTOR is able to “convince” another strategy to coop-
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erate (if it is in principle willing to) through offering cooperation at the
cost of lower payoff in the present round for achieving “the greater good”
in the long run. If, on the other hand, mutual cooperation were bad overall
(which could be easily implemented by adjusting the payoff values of the
stage game accordingly), PREDICTOR would not initiate mutual coopera-
tion. What looks as if it was a “morally good” behavior which benefited
every party, follows from PREDICTOR’s (selfish) assessment of the future
consequences of its present actions.
Much in the spirit of the initial studies by Axelrod [1], this shows how
apparent morality could have emerged from “intelligent selfishness”. More
generally, this illustrates a basic virtue of good agent-based-models in the
social and psychological sciences [19]: While a complex behavior based on an
explicit representation of “perceived intention” could be straightforwardly
implemented — for example by implementing a mechanism akin to a “theory
of mind” (as suggested by Press & Dyson [16]) – ideally, a model would
evolve a behavior that looks as if it stemmed from such a representation but
in fact emerged from a much simpler underlying mechanism – such as the
learning mechanism of PREDICTOR.
5 Conclusion
We have outlined PREDICTOR, a strategy that learns from its experience to
choose optimal actions by modeling its opponent and predicting a (fictive)
future. It has been shown that PREDICTOR is an efficient strategy for
playing the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, which is simple to implement. In
the simulated tournament studied in this work, it achieved high average
scores and won the tournament for various parameter settings. PREDICTOR
relies on a brief phase of exploration to improve its model, and it is able to
evolve morality from intrinsically selfish behavior.
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Supporting Information
S1: Memory-1 strategies selected for the tournament
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S2: Calculating Expected Payoffs
PREDICTOR’s decision affects (i) present payoffs but also (ii) future payoffs.
We assume that PREDICTOR is equally weighting both (i.e. it makes no
further assumption about a discount for future payoffs).
For every (present or future) turn, PREDICTOR needs to estimate the
payoff for what is likely to happen in case it chooses a particular action
now + what will likely happen after he has chosen this action (up to the
n-th turn). We will write 〈PO〉(A1A2 . . . An) as the expected payoff of
some specific sequence of choices of actions, A1A2 . . . An. At every turn,
PREDICTOR is free to chose a new action. It therefore needs to estimate
following distinct alternative sequences of actions:
〈PO〉 := 〈PO〉(A1) + 〈PO〉(A1A2) + 〈PO〉(A1A2 . . . An) (9)
For example, setting n = 2 and having Aj ∈ {C,D}, there are four alter-
natives (k can take 2n possible values, each corresponding to one action
sequence):
〈PO〉0 = 〈PO〉(C) + 〈PO〉(C,C) (10)
〈PO〉1 = 〈PO〉(C) + 〈PO〉(C,D) (11)
〈PO〉2 = 〈PO〉(D) + 〈PO〉(D,C) (12)
〈PO〉3 = 〈PO〉(D) + 〈PO〉(D,D) (13)
PREDICTOR evaluates these alternatives and then chooses the action A1 =
C or D that corresponds to the largest 〈PO〉k.
Expected payoffs for one turn can be calculated as:
〈PO〉(A1) =
∑
A′1
PO(A1A
′
1)p(A
′
1|A1X0) =
∑
A′1
PO(A1A
′
1)p(A
′
1|X0), (14)
with X0 = A0A
′
0 denoting the initially given action-pair. The last equal-
ity holds because the opponent’s choice of A′1 is independent from the
player’s choice A1. We assume that PREDICTOR knows all possible pay-
offs, PO(AtA
′
t); the conditional probabilities of the type p(A
′
t|At−1A′t−1)
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are contents of its model. In our example from above, PREDICTOR would
thus need to calculate
〈PO〉(C) = PO(CC)p(C|X0) + PO(CD)p(D|X0), (15)
and mutatis mutandis for 〈PO〉(D).
For the next turn, PREDICTOR would need to calculate objects of the form:
〈PO〉(A1, A2) =
∑
A′2
PO(A2A
′
2)
∑
A′1
p(A′2|A′1A1X0)p(A′1|A1X0) (16)
In case the opponent is playing a memory-1 strategy, conditional probabili-
ties only depend on the very last time step p(A′2|A1A′1X0) = p(A′2|A1A′1). In
general, this assumption is not true for all strategies, but given the property
of memory-1 strategies discovered by Press & Dyson (2012), this will be a
good approximation throughout. The above expression would thus simplify:
〈PO〉(A1, A2) =
∑
A′1,A
′
2
PO(A2A
′
2)p(A
′
2|A′1A1)p(A′1|X0) (17)
Again for the concrete example, one object to be evaluated would be:
〈PO〉(C,D) =
∑
A′1,A
′
2
PO(DA′2)p(A
′
2|CA′1)p(A′1|X0) (18)
= PO(DC) [p(C|CC)p(C|X0) + p(C|CD)p(D|X0)] (19)
+PO(DD) [p(D|CC)p(C|X0) + p(D|CD)p(D|X0)] .(20)
Note that, under the assumption of memory-1 strategies, no objects with
n ≥ 3 need to be calculated, since 〈PO〉(A1A2 . . . An) = 〈PO〉(An−1An).
This means that, when playing against a memory-1 strategy, present choices
can be “undone” with the next future choice. For the case of the IPD, all
entries proportional to PO(CD) will be zero, as well as many conditional
probabilities (e.g. p(C|DX) = 0 for TFT).
In the IPD, a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, the optimal choice
at the last turn is known to be D, no matter what the opponent plays. This
simplifies concrete implementation, and only 〈PO〉1 and 〈PO〉3 will need to
be considered.
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S3: Workflow of PREDICTOR
Algorithm for PREDICTOR:
1. Initialize with random model
2. Repeat until game is finished
• Predict future courses (depth=2) of the game based on current
model and previous actions
• Calculate expected payoffs for all possible futures (depth=2) and
choose action for the next step that maximizes expected payoff
• Record opponent’s actions, receive payoff and update model
3. After each match: set model back model to random
S4: Payoff-data for the round robin
Table 5 lists all payoffs during the round robin tournament with parameters
Nturn = 200, Niter = 5 and pexp = 0.1. Table 6 list some specific turns for
selected matches; parameters the same as above.
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Table 6: PREDICTOR against TFT (top) and against WSLS (bottom) for
the beginning of a match, with the model being most uncertain, and for the
ending of a match, with the model being most informative.
turn PREDICTOR TFT turn PREDICTOR TFT turn PREDICTOR TFT
1. D C 11 D C 191 C C
2. D D 12 C D 192 C C
3. D D 13 D C 193 C C
4. D D 14 C D 194 C C
5. D D 15 D C 195 C C
6. D D 16 C D 196 C C
7. C D 17 D C 197 C C
8. D C 18 C D 198 C C
9. C D 19 D C 199 C C
10. D C 20 C D 200 C C
〈PO〉n=10 2.0 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0
turn PREDICTOR WSLS turn PREDICTOR WSLS
1. D C 191 C C
2. D D 192 C C
3. D C 193 C C
4. D D 194 C C
5. D C 195 C C
6. D D 196 C C
7. D C 197 C C
8. D D 198 C C
9. D C 199 C C
10. D D 200 C C
〈PO〉n=10 3.0 0.5 3 3
28
S5: Payoff as function of exploration
Table 7: Fraction of exploration, PREDICTOR’s average payoff, the differ-
ence to ZD-GTFT-2’s payoff, place in the tournament, number of wins (for
selected values of pexp).
pexp 〈PO〉 ∆ZD-GTFT-2 place # wins
0. 2.499 0.052 2 5
0.05 2.549 0.099 1 4
0.1 2.547 0.115 1 5
0.15 2.516 0.065 1 4
0.2 2.536 0.083 1 4
0.25 2.48 0.049 2 5
0.3 2.484 0.049 1 4
0.35 2.4618 0.023 2 5
0.4 2.451 0.027 2 4
0.45 2.467 0.034 1 5
0.5 2.413 -0.023 3 4
0.55 2.412 -0.011 3 4
0.6 2.379 -0.027 4 5
0.65 2.378 -0.011 3 4
0.7 2.361 -0.044 3 5
0.75 2.356 -0.050 4 5
0.8 2.310 -0.077 4 4
0.85 2.324 -0.051 4 4
0.9 2.294 -0.099 4 5
0.95 2.269 -0.119 5 5
1. 2.254 -0.093 7 4
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